The aim of this week’s seminar is to evaluate, ‘what is an air campaign?’ There is an argument that there is no such thing. The term is a modern one: it was a strategic air offensive against Germany, not an offensive air campaign. But our aim is to try and discern what actually is involved in mounting an air campaign. Clearly it is a lot more than highly trained young people operating very expensive pieces of equipment.

The task for this week is different to the other seminars as it is not a set of questions.

 Task

You are sitting in your office and your superior drops in. You are informed that a non-military group is visiting your workplace to gain a better understanding of the military. Your boss recalls nominating you for the Advanced Air Power Course and tasks you to contribute by providing a brief on air power.

Your boss directs you to prepare a paper on what you believe to be the elements of an air campaign, the planning factors involved and why you think that these considerations are important. Your boss does not want a detailed written brief. A short, dot point brief will suffice.

More correctly, perhaps, the air component of the joint campaign…? There is less planning for an air campaign per se than there are air-specific aspect of planning for the campaign – but these sit a fair way down the planning food chain…thus the key elements of an air campaign are largely those for a campaign…so what might those elements be…?

My boss says I’m not allowed to play with bullets but here goes…

·         Why are we here? What does the Government want from our involvement? There is often a big difference between that which is publicly stated and the effects actually desired.

·         How are we going to do that? This leads to developing various courses of action to achieve the desired effects.

·         What will define our point of exit, i.e.  measures of success or otherwise? To quote Princess Leia from the original Star Wars “When you broke in here, did you have a plan for getting out?”

·         Are we leaders or led?Are we sending a self-sufficient force or discrete capabilities to support others?

·         What/who will we use to do it? This is a natural product of developing the ‘how’ above.

·          Who will we be working with and what issues arise from that, and more so in ad hoc coalitions? Is there a lead nation? Do we subscribe to their (or compatible) doctrine? Who arbitrates the differences?

·         How will we meet our sustainment leads? Always a good topic to consider prior to departure and to burst any assumption bubbles?

·         When do we have to be there?

·         Are we ready for this? Or do we need a build-up period to achieve an operational level of capability for this campaign?

The answers to these questions provide the framework which is fleshed out and developed by the layers of detail questions that follow…leading to a campaign plan Within the campaign plan will be specific lines of operation dedicated to achieving specific effects and this is where specifc environmental (air, land, sea, SF, etc) roles and tasks are developed. The detailed planning of specific air tasks lies under the heading of ‘Conducting Air Operations”….

The effectiveness of Japanese naval and land air power came as a surprise to the western powers. In 1941 Japanese aircraft operating in theatre were far superior to those of Britain and the United States. Racism underwrote the devaluation of Japanese technical and military ability. Japanese culture itself by 1944 rejected the idea of serious air attacks on the Japanese homeland. One result was the killing of 100,000 civilians by one conventional air attack alone carried out on Tokyo in March 1945. This seminar attempts to analyse the rise and fall of the Imperial Japanese Air Force.

There was no such thing as an Imperial Japanese Air Force leading up or during WW2. The Navy and Army both had their own totally separate (in R&D, production and operations) air arms that were organised and employed solely as supporting arms to their parent services. This duality is one of a number of key factors that constrained Japanese air power during WW2 from its potential as an element of military power.

Questions

To what extent did Japanese air power contribute to their successes?

As above Japanese air power was structured entirely as a supporting arm for its parent service and thus was employed largely at the tactical level. Even the attack on Pearl Harbor was only a supporting operation in support of the Co-prosperity Sphere land grab in late 1941 and early 1942. Had the Pearl Harbor attack not proceeded or had it been unsuccessful, the Japanese were still totally confident (with good reason) in their ability to defeat the US Navy during any Plan Orange engagement.

Even despite the IJN’s investment in naval aviation, the big gun battleship was still the primary striking decisive arm of Japanese naval power. Thus, while the losses at Midway were painful, they were not perceived as a strategic capability loss. This was reinforced by the ability of the Japanese to cover most of their (temporary) empire with land-based air power. The naval aviation could have been employed much more effectively than it was and not frittered away on excursions like that against Commonwealth forces in the Indian Ocean, and the knee-jerk Midway operation. The only time that Japanese naval aviation might have had a truly strategic effect would have been if, having sunk the Lexington, it had stayed in the game and provided top cover to the invasion of New Guinea at Port Moresby.

Over the land environment, the air arm of the Japanese Army was very much like the Luftwaffe in 1939: a well-honed tactical support tool optimised for tactical support to Army operations. Although the Army had experimented with long-range bombers in the 30s, most notably the Ki-20 version of the revolutionary Junkers G.38 flying wing, it did not follow through in this area. Its late war attempts to revitalise long range bombing through the likes of ‘Renzan’ and ‘Shinzan’ were not as advanced as contemporary Western design and were ‘too little, too late’ at a time when the dire need was for superlative day and night fighters.

The ultimate outcome of Japan’s inability to adequately harness air power in WW2 and the period leading up to it was to benefit the Allies in two ways. Firstly, there was the obvious lack of an effective air arm to counter; secondly, Japan’s continued investment in air power diverted resources from other arms and technologies that may have posed a greater risk to Allied operations, in particular, powerful long-range submarines.

In what ways was Japanese technology superior to western technology in 1941 – 1942 and why was it so seriously underestimated?

The primary enabler for Japanese superiority, or perceptions of such superiority as the period of superiority ended at sea in June 1942, and on land in August the same year, are not so much the hardware as the personnel employing it. As I covered off in Seminar 1, a crucial aspect of air power is the people on which it relies. The Japanese in the build-up to and conduct of the land grab are a good example of forces that trained, trained and trained again, and similarly rehearsed, rehearsed and rehearsed again. The net result was that, at the time of Pearl Harbor and the six months immediately following, Japanese soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines were a match for any in the world. The same could be same for their commanders, most definitely at the tactical and operational level but debatably not at the level of strategic command and design.

Apart from bio-warfare which was not employed in WW2 and thus is a moot topic, I do not believe that Japan had technological edge over its competitors, including Germany, at any point before or during WW2. Its ships had no or rudimentary radar but compensated for this with crews much more competent, initially, in night engagements; the Long Lance torpedo was definitely a better weapon than its American contemporaries but this is probably more an indictment of poor American design and quality control; and the legendary Zero fighter, along with other designs, achieved its performance through sacrifices in armour, self-sealing fuel tanks and armament.

During its brief period of operations, the American Volunteer Group, the Flying Tigers of legend, adapted conventional western turning air combat doctrine into a slash and run approach that was highly effective. This tactics were passed onto and employed successfully by US pilots in the Pacific who largely sought to avoid engaging the more nimble but less robust Japanese fighters’ strength opting instead to attack their weaknesses. As the war progressed, Japan’s pool of highly trained and experienced airmen and sailors was whittled away to the point that nimble performance was no longer enough to prevent almost total Allied control of Pacific sea and skies. In the final analysis, Japan fought a ‘come as you are’ war, with an inadequate base for either expansion or sustainment. From an air power perspective, Japan had no Spitfire, Ju-88, Mosquito or B-17 that was capable of on-going development throughout the war.

The West’s failure to fully grasp the level of capability achieved by Japan by 1940, especially in the air is no different than similar ‘failures’ in Europe. However some care must be taken not to believe too fully the popular myth that the West totally under-rated Japan’s capabilities across the board. Certainly, Japan’s Navy was seen as a very credible threat by its potential adversaries. The capability of naval aviation, at the time of Pearl Harbor, had not been proven with successes like Taranto being over-shadowed by losses and ineffectiveness in the Norway and Mediterranean campaigns. Similarly, assessments of the Japanese threat on land were based on contemporary doctrine for conflict in the jungle, for which there had been no real conflict from which to learn. It’s easy to make charges of complacency and incompetence through the lens of hindsight….and let’s also not forget that any superiority, real or perceived, that Japan may have had was fully expended no more than nine months after Pearl Harbor AND that the allies had agreed to make the defeat of Germany their main effort – had they not, it is quite likely that Japan would have been defeated much earlier, most likely through sheer starvation than inaugural use of nuclear weapons.

American firepower did defeat the Kamikaze. Would a modern terrorist employing air power really be immune from attack?

As brutal as the kamikaze attacks were, they were a last desperate act of a defeated warrior caste and never a sustainable tactic. As dramatic as the footage of naval close-in defensive fire is, many kamikaze never got even remotely close to the fleet, especially after the Japanese TTPs were identified and were interdicted by air power not fire power. In addition to reinforced CAPs, allied attacks on Japanese homeland airfields continued as did heavy bomber attacks on Japanese industry and infrastructure. The kamikaze achieved initial success through the element of surprise as did other ‘shock effect’ attacks like the Zeppelin raids on London, Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle Raid and 911. All of these achieved initial or ‘one-off’ success that was unlikely to be repeated or sustained.

With specific regard to terrorist air attack, this is not the forum in which to discuss or even speculate on specific counters to such avenues of attack. That notwithstanding, any international traveller is only too well aware of the international security measures now in effect and which are constantly evolving; and even the media carries regular examples of how well positive air control has been implemented by most, if not all, western nations. All this is to discourage terrorist attack from the air.

Throughout the history of conflict there have been developments in tactics or equipment that have had a surprise effect – some have been unsustainable one-offs, others have changed the nature of conflict in their time. Ten years after 911, with no repeat attacks, one might hypothesise that 911-style attacks fall into the former category. Have said that, who is to know new and unexpected tactic might not be employed with devastating success tomorrow – such is the nature of this profession.

What important conclusions can be drawn from the early successes and later failures of Japanese air power?

Such successes that were, were fairly tactical in nature and not decisive in the conduct of the war. They were all supporting acts to wider naval and land operations. It is true that the successes of Pearl Harbor and the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales were repeated but it doesn’t count when this is your enemy doing it back to you. Some conclusions from the Pacific air war that future air aggressors might wish to consider:

• Pick your enemies carefully.
• Be prepared for the long war.
• Have an industrial and R&D base to sustain the long war.
• Apply the principle of unity of effort and do run not just separate but competing air arms.
• Vaccinate against ‘Victory’ disease and don’t over-extend.
• Secure your lines of communication.
• Aircraft survivability systems are a good thing.

To paraphrase c/s Charlie from that great aviation training resource Top Gun, Japan’s use of air power in WW2 is a great example of how not to do it.

At the end of the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe remained intact as an effective fighting force and so did Fighter Command. By April 1945, the Luftwaffe had virtually be destroyed. Does this result suggest a ‘best practice’ method of conducting a defensive counter-air campaign?

An interesting approach, attempting to compare a fairly localised battle (the Battle of Britain was only really the opening of the Seelowe campaign) that last only a few months and a campaign that lasted three years and which ranged across Western Europe.

That both, one or neither force survived the Battle of Britain is largely irrelevant – the key issue is whether they achieved their objectives or not. The the answer to that is probably that neither actually did. The Luftwaffe was charged to clear the RAF from the skies over southern England and the Channel to enable the invasion of Great Britain to commence. The RAF’s mission was to prevent this occurring, and while neither the attainment of control of the air by the Luftwaffe nor the invasion of Great Britain occurred, it is a big ask for the RAF or indeed the Allies to take credit for this (except under the victors’ right to write history as they see it. The key determinator of the outcome of the Battle of Britain was Germany’s decision to switcvh its targeting from the RAF’s forward airfields, where it was without question winning the battle, to a strategically-(mis?)focussed attack on major industrial targets. This provided the RAF a vital respite to regroup and recover and then focus on defeating the Luftwaffe whiule not being under attack itself. It is more true to say that the Battle of Britain was lost by Germany than it was won by the RAF.

It is also not particularly correct to say that the Luftwaffe was virtually destroyed without applying a broader context to the statement. The Luftwaffe continued to fly operationally right up to the last day of the war and hundreds if not thousands of operational aircraft were captured at the war’s end. Not only did German aircraft production increase as the war progressed, it also continued to introduce new technological capabilities into 1945, for the example, operational jet aircraft far in advance of anything that the Allies had on the drawing board. The death knell for the Luftwaffe was not a lack of aircraft or pilots to fly them, but simply places to fly them from (as Allied armies advanced from the West, East and South) and, in the end, fuel to put in them.

We have to be very careful in our use of terminology in this kind of question. There is a major difference between a defensive counter-air campaign, a defensive air campaign and the air component of a defensive campaign. I would contend that defensive counter-air is what we planned on doing in Western Europe should 8 Guards Army ever been so rash as to step across the border casting covetous eyes at the Channel ports, that is, striking deep across the curtain to dislocate and disrupt Warsaw Pact aviation capabilities; a defensive air campaign is what the RAF conducted over southern England in the summer of 1940, and which the Luftwaffe conducted over Western Europe from the end of the Battle of Britain until D-Day; and the air component of a larger defensive campaign is what the Luftwaffe was doing on the Eastern Front from 1943 (probably since the Battle of Kursk) and over Western Europe after D-Day.

Referring back to Seminar Three though, it might seem that the ‘best practice’ that arises from both the Battle of Britain and the air defence of Germany is doctrinal. I remember noting when I read Command of the Air that it must have been a key informing document for the rebirth of the Luftwaffe. But as I read, I started to get the impression that perhaps the creators of the Luftwaffe had only read as far as Part One and not fully grasped the full scope of Douhet’s thoughts. Thinking further on the subject, it was apparent that nor had they grasped the Principle of War relating to the setting and maintenance of the aim; nor that Mahan had attached considerable importance to the need to ensure that any national intent to control any environment must be fully backed up by the capability to apply that control.

The best practice to be taken away is that, if you have an objective, stick to it. Germany failed to do so during the Battle of Britain; and the Allies did in pursuing Germany’s unconditional surrender in May 1945.

Might it remain true that a successful defence for the control of the air between 1939 – 1945 depend on:

a. Early detection.

b. Interpretation of enemy intent.

c. Successful interception.

d. Destruction or deterrence?

Douhet struck the nail fair on the head when he identified the difficulties facing a nation attempting to defend against a like (in terms of capabilities) adversary. Of the four factors listed above, only two are really relevant: successful interception and deterrence. Both the RAF in the Battle of Britain and the Luftwaffe (all arms) had both early detection and relatively interpretation of enemy intent (tactically to strategically) but this clearly did not provide a suitably large advantage over their adversaries. Both failed to successfully intercept attacking forces – success interception being defined as adequate to turn back or neutralise e.g. force them to jettison their payloads, the attacking force.

When a high probability of successful interception is attained or is perceived to have been attained, a state of deterrence may have been achieved. This state existed over most of England from 1941 onwards; in the Mediterranean from the end of 1942; and over the Pacific as the US advanced north from the Solomon Islands. Where desperation or perhaps learning difficulties deny acceptance of a state of deterrence, we have situations like those of the air bridge that attempted to supply the Afrika Korps in Tunisia in 1943; and many of the Japanese (non-kamikaze) air attacks in the latter part of the war.

And has modern technology rendered this quartet of questions obsolete?

As already alluded to above, the advance of time and technology has not altered the response to the question above. Ultimately, while early detection AND accurate interpretation of enemy intent are important enablers, the critical objective is successful interception. Robin Olds’ Bolo tactic against North Vietnamese air defences relied on early detection of US aircraft but equally depended on an inaccurate North Vietnamese interpretation of his intentions to enable successful interception of North Vietnamese defending aircraft. In the Falklands War, it still remains unclear to what extent the British received early warning from the mainland of impending Argentinian attacks. Regardless, the key to maintaining the fleet in San Carlos Bay and other key areas, and ultimately the success of the campaign to retake the islands, was successful interception. Deterrence also played a part in defence of the task force as the sinking of the General Belgrano early in the campaign effectively deterred Argentinean use of its aircraft carrier in the defence of the Malvinas.

The state of deterrence described under the previous over the Gulf can also be seen in DESERT STORM; and over Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 and 2001 respectively. It may also be why there were no offensive North Vietnamese air operations 1965-73: while the NVAF proved to be a capable defender over its own territory, it was under no illusions as to the outcome had it attempted offensive action against US bases in Thailand, South Vietnam or sailing off the coast. This state of deterrence is one reason why there have been no air incursions into Iraq or Afghanistan and why all incursions have been by land and, for the most part, below the general detection threshold of coalition forces.

The so-called Principles of War include the concept of the offensive. In short, this means to act rather than react, to dictate the time and place, purpose, scope and intensity, pace of operations. It implies the initiative must be seized, retained and fully exploited. From the British and German experience of moulding a defensive counter-air campaign, would such a principle apply equally well to the Defensive!?

Excuse me? “So-called” Principles of War? This questions would indicate that the Principles aren’t that well understand at all…

To understand the concept of the offensive, more so from an air perspective, one only needs to read the early parts of Command of the Air where Douhet lays out the dilemma of the defender. A defensive campaign does not win a war: at best it gains some breathing space. Wellington still had to thump Napoleon at Waterloo, ten years after the defensive victory of Trafalgar; the Allies still had to defeat Germany after the Battle of Britain, otherwise there was little to prevent Germany regrouping and having another crack, especially had it postponed BARBAROSSA; and the Task Force still had to kick the Argies off the Falklands after gaining control of the air over the theatre.

Is an examination of the Battle of Britain and the German defence of the Reich irrelevant to the study of the modern air power applications?

Absolutely but only so long as they are considering within the context within which they occurred: neither can be usefully considered in isolation. What ‘won’ the Battle of Britain was not the RAF but Germany’s decision to not apply the Principle of Selection and Maintenance of the Aim to its air campaign against Britain in 1940. Similarly, Germany’s defeat was a given once America entered the war: regardless of the skill and capability of the Luftwaffe, Germany, like Japan, could simply not compete with America’s industrial and economic horsepower: a lesson the Soviet Union would also learn in 1989.

Why does the Battle of Britain appear to occupy such an important position in the history of air power?

There is much about the Battle of Britain that supports a good myth ranging from Churchill’s words at the time (we will fight them on the beaches,blood sweat and tears, so much to so few, etc); the Arthurian connection to the Merlin; the perception of the under-dog standing up to the local bully; of a few against the many a la Thermopylae, Agincourt, Rorke’s Drift, etc. It was also the first time that the defence of a nation relied so heavily upon an air force and not more traditional land and naval forces but as stated above, it was not the first time that an air force changed the course of a campaign: the Doolittle Raid, Malta or Crete would be better candidates for this distinction. Like Midway and Coral Sea, the Battle of Britain does mark the limit of the Axis advance, noted by Churchill in his ‘end of the beginning’ speech on 10 November 1942.

NJG 1 by Michael Turner

It’s been almost a hundred years and it’s unlikely that we will ever really know just what effect WW1 really did have on the development of air power. For me, it was really a bit of a sideshow in a larger conflict and the real developments occurred in the 20s and 30s.

With reference to the second reading, I’ve read Mahan a number of times (how sad is that?) and don’t agree with the  way the author has tried to use it as a yardstick to measure air power in WW1 – I’d be hard pressed to draw the same conclusions. The big takeaway (to use a current buzzword) from The Influence of Seapower Upon History is that is a nation should only get into the sea power game if it can actually control the seas. Examples of that have would be the United Kingdom to the mid-20th Century and the United States from the same point on; those who tried but didn’t make the grade? France, Spain, Germany (twice), and Japan. The same applies to air power…

What might defence planners have learnt from the use of air power in the First World War?

There is a lot that might have been learned from any major activity but that’s largely a speculator question because we will never know what might have happened. The best articulator of the air lessons of WW1 was Douhet and his 1923 writings give a very good idea of what defence planners might have been learned. In the end, the one lesson that defence planners did take from WW1 and generally apply across the board was that “…this air power all seems a bit up in the air – let’s toss it back in its box and seen what happens in a few years…” And that is exactly what they did, especially in the UK where the RAF of 1939 bore a remarkable resemblance in terms of doctrine and capability to that of 1919: twin-engined bombers with small payloads and only defenced by single small calibre machine guns and (excluding the Hurricane and  Spitfire that were spurred by Germany’s rearmament in the 30s) biplane fighters with no radios and only two small calibre machine guns…

Could valid generalisations have been made for the future use of air power from the experience of the 1914 – 1918 war?

Not really, for the simple reason that air power did not really have any great effect in WW1: there was no air Cambrai, let alone a Taranto, Dams Raid or Pearl Harbor to learn from. Had air power not been employed in WW1, it is likely that WW2 would have started with the same level of air capability that it actually did: the major driver for the development of air technologies between the wars was not the military (by choice or treaty) but the commercial arena especially in the UK (Shorts), Germany (Junkers and Dornier) and the US (Boeing, Bell and Curtiss) and with the development and exploration of long-range travel routes  It would probably be more correct to say that modern air power owes more to the Dornier X and the HP.42 that it does to anything that struggled into the air in WW1.

Was the assertion made by some that air power would soon become the principal mode of warfare justified by experience?

Not then and not now…the number of instances where air power has had a decisive strategic effect on the outcome of a conflict is so low as to be insignificant statistically or in any other form of comparison. 93 years on, air power has still not taken up the mantle of ‘principal mode of warfare’ and is unlikely to anytime soon.

Would you agree that there have been no significant developments in the employment of air power since 1918?

Not ever. A statement like that can only be made with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight and some incredible leaps of logical faith. Air Power (such as it was) til the mid-30s bears no resemblance to the applied tactical, operational and strategic forces developed and applied during WW2 and since to the current day. Flying around shooting guns and dropping ad hoc bombs ≠ air power: there are far more components of air power that mere flying as I alluded to in my response to last week’s questions. WW1’s biggest contribution to air power was probably the misperception that populations can be controlled from the air alone as was attempted across the Empire in the 1920s – although, COL Gaddafi may prove me wrong on this one next week…