
The Cove is one of the best things that the Australian Army ever did – following in the footsteps of the Marines to provide a platform for anyone to state their case or offer a view contrary to official positons and doctrine. The New Zealand Army, about the time that Chris Parsons was DCA, tried to follow suite but it seemed into the too-hard bin after he moved on.
Even though that was a while back, I still subscribed to The Cove and occassionally an item of interest pops up in the email sumamry of new material. That was the story today when I stumbled across Michael York’s Doctrine VS Reality – FPV Drones, Targeting Authority, and the Doctrinal Gap.
Not only is it a good read in its own right – well-structured, logical and well-presented – it is a very good analysis of some of the broader implications of Ukraine-style drone wars once they start to spread. Which they inevitabley will – we have already seen the US and its Middle East get a caning from Houthi and Iranian drones in the last two years – and that, team is probably only the beginning…
It’s pretty clear that some of the posters criticing this piece aren’t really that up to speed on the reality of drone warfare, not just FPV, in Ukraine. It’s a natural response to want to and try to squeeze something new and radical and threatening into a nice conventional box: kind of like weeing in an ambush: feels good for little while…
These conflicts and threats are coming to us even if we opt out of going to them. And they aren’t just the domain of conventional military forces of structures: drones empower irregular agencies orders of magnitude more than the IEDs of the 2000s. As much as we continue to prepare for the war we want – something like the Fulda Gap or what grandad did in the desert – we actually need to be actually adapting to what is far more likely to be coming.
Russia could probably offer some good insights into “war we wanted” versus “war we got“
And (yes, I know, dear edjos – don’t start a sentence with ‘and’) these conflicts are engage the full span of national power, those boring acronyms like DIME and JIMP (no references to Pulp Fiction, please) and we cannot count on all operators being fine upstanding members of the conventional traditional (possibly a little boring) military. If the skill is to be able to pilot (sorry RAAFies) a drone remotely, an operator might not even need to be IN the military let alone do 2.4km in <10 minutes or even know what a BMI is. Your best drone operators may be from the gaming community, they may have long hair and sleep in until 1000. They may not have the same ethical foundation as the Defence force or even being employed in an organisation with enforced ethical structures – but they may be the very best at this newest form of war…
When we consider Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUMT), this is what we’re talking about: not just CCA flying along side F35 or launching Air-Launched Effects (ALE) – an euphemism for air-launched drones – from attack helicopters. Teaming can also involve teams created across the spectrum of society – not just from the military – to design, build, prepare and operate what are essentially mass-market military drones. This further expans the concerns raised in the Cove article: how do we embed targeting and ethical cultures into the irregular parts of out teams…?
IMHO, the OP has written a timely and relevant warning to the ADF – and those nearby who might follow it – that emerging technologies may be the least part of the new/latest contemporary operating environment…
Those who do learn remains as true as it ever did…

















