Fill your hand, you sunnovabitch!!!

Posted on 2 February 2011 by SJPONeill

johnwaynetruegrit

The Jeff Bridges’ version of True Grit opens here tomorrow…coincidentally, I only watched the original John Wayne version from 1969 on the weekend and commented to Carmen the other night that so much of the lines in the trailers for the remake were word-for-word from the original, I wondered if there was going to be much different about the new version other than Rooster gets to wear his patch on the other eye this time round…

So, imagine my surprise to read in today’s DomPost that “…where Wayne played Cogburn as a one-dimensional veteran gunslinger, the original Rooster of the novel (brilliantly rendered by Jeff Bridges in the Coen’s version) is drunken, half-blind, smelly and deeply flawed…” Furthermore, this amazing bad and inaccurate review, in this nation’s second largest daily, isn’t even by a Kiwi – it’s some loser called Ben Macintyre who writes for something called The Times…my recollection of John Wayne’s performance, only days old, is exactly of “…drunken, half-blind, smelly and deeply flawed…”

Dean’s comments yesterday notwithstanding – and they do apply more to general soldiery than to the specifics of those in sensitive roles – I really worry if that bumper sticker actually has a broader application beyond the intel community into the general information community. I’m reading Dean Koontz’ Cold Fire this week and parts of that also struck a similar chord with me as the reporter lead in the story laments to demise of good old fashioned ‘honest’ reporting in favour of what sells – and that was written in 1991…

I’m on base for the next couple of days and was able to catch the big TV in the bar free tonight and take it over to keep up with Coro – waiting to see how, not when, Molly and Kev’s little affair gets blown – but was reading today’s paper in the ad breaks. Maybe it was just a slow news day but I was disappointed at how superficial many of the items were…we don’t get a paper delivered at home and, really, why would we bother if all it’s going to be good for is starting the fire and wrapping the frozens when we go away…

I find now that I get greater stimulus from the non-professionals on the internet; in fact, I would have to say that Michael Yon’s Facebook page, when he isn’t whining about milkooks, or general officers who have (apparently) slighted him, offers a very good range of cues; as do the Facebook pages for the USN’s Information Dominance Corp and Marine Corps Gazette; Small Wars Journal and Travels with Shiloh…

I wonder whether the maturity of the information age also means the demise of the true professional reporter in favour of info-marketeers who tailor their stories to specific markets (as opposed to audiences), and the rise of the information militia as the new voice of the ‘news’…?

I did find a couple of interesting titbits in the Dompost:

The capital of Afghanistan,Kabul, was rocketed by rebels – in 1993. It’s quite strange to think of a time where it was necessary to state that Kabul was the capital of Afghanistan.
And also on this day in 1944, NZ pilot Irving Smith led Mosquito bombers in a pinpoint raid on Amiens prison to save condemned prisoners. If nothing else, a timely reminder that airpower is more than just running a flying bus service and providing direct support to the troops on the ground.
In 1848, Mexico ends a US invasion by ceding Texas, New Mexico and California to the US. If Mexico does get a handle on the cartel wars soon, I wonder what they have to trade-off against the next US invasion..?
In 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khoumeini becomes the de facto leader of Iran and the place has gone steadily downhill since. While Europe and the US get all antsy about Iran’s nuclear programme (but not Pakistan’s), the biggest risk offered by Iran to regional instability comes from its increasingly dissatisfied youth. The best thing that the US and NATO could do is invite Iran into Afghanistan, get it committed (entangled) by both its own rhetoric and the tarbaby mess that is Afghanistan; and then step back and watch it all unravel…Iran, that is – Afghanistan does need anyone’s help top unravel…just install an unpopular (in every sense of the word) leader and retire to a safe distance….

Surely not?

Posted on 1 February 2011 by SJPONeill

Just saw this item on Michael Yon’s Facebook page…you can read the actual article on Wired. I have to admit that I find this an excellent source of hints for places to look and issues to consider…

It would be quite scary to think that our intelligence apparatus weren’t being filled by our best and brightest but then there was this bumper sticker I saw…

In all seriousness, if we’re fighting in an environment where information rules, surely it is critical that we resource the mechanisms that process and analyse our information accordingly…?

Reading between the lines in the article, it sounds as though there is quite a bit of tap-dancing and backstepping going on – and that all the checks and balances one would assume at that level weren’t so much no in place but simply weren’t being followed…it’s all a bit difficult…

Well done, that man!!

Posted on 18 January 2011 by SJPONeill

Strangely, I picked this up from Michael Yon and not the local media…

!cid_0de301e8-80d0-4ac3-b6b3-22e6635e1ced

(Photo by U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer Joshua Treadwell)

Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), awarded the Meritorious Service Medal to New Zealand Army Lt. Col. Chris J. Parsons, during a ceremony in Kabul, Afghanistan, Jan. 13. NZ Ambassador to Afghanistan Neville Reilly attended the ceremony. The Meritorious Service Medal is the highest US decoration that can be awarded to an officer who is not a general for exceptional contribution to the ISAF mission. Under Parsons’ command, NZ Army 1st SAS significantly hindered the insurgents’ ability to reconstitute and conduct actions against Coalition Forces, resulting in increased security for the people of Afghanistan. Parsons returns to New Zealand after a four month tour in Afghanistan.

The head of the New Zealand SAS in Afghanistan has been recognised by the United States with its top honour for foreign officers.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Parsons was presented with the Defense Meritorious Service Medal last week in Kabul.

New Zealand Defence Minister Wayne Mapp says it’s testament to Lieutenant Colonel Parsons’ leadership and also recognition of the work the entire SAS unit is doing in the Afghan capital.

Dr Mapp says each time he meets top American servicepeople they remark on the professionalism of the SAS unit.

He says the award is given for exceptional leadership over a sustained period of time.

Dr Mapp says it is the third time during his tenure as Defence Minister that the medal has been awarded to a New Zealander.

It’s good to see a Kiwi recognised at any time but even better when it’s a mate from wayback…I first met Chris in 1995 when I was commissioned over the space of a weekend and inflicted on Headquarters Support Command and the Trentham Officers Mess…it wasn’t long before he’d led a group of us through a blizzard to the top of the snow-clad mountain for a formal dinner…because we could…

…and because the sun was so bright, everyone wore their special sunglasses…

Leadership has always been one of Chris’ (many) strong suites and I count myself very fortunate not only to know him as a friend but to have worked for and with him in a number of other appointments…

Well done, mate…

Edit: updated with image of award ceremony and Stuff caption…

Ha–bloody – ha

Posted on 12 January 2011 by SJPONeill

Hyena-laughing

It’s been a while since I visited my blogroll but I am making a serious attempt to get back into a proper work routine that balances my blogwork with Air Force projects, domestic ‘honey todos’, and my relationships with Hawkeye UAV and FX Bikes…I’m well into my summer programme which seeks to do as much work from home in order to optimise the longer summer days for honey todos: it’s just a case of getting the balance right…

So, having spent a day on base reviewing draft doctrine and keeping up with ASIC admin, I’m now feet up catching up with UK Masterchef and attempting some concurrent activity blog-surfing…

My first stop was Coming Anarchy…twas a bit of a worry when the first headline I saw was “Invade New Zealand!” but fortunately it’s actually a series of links to some great satirical Aussie piss-takings from a couple of years back – have a look and a laugh!

Speaking of having a laugh, and the reason for this post’s title, was a brief commentary on Julian Assange’s lawyers having a squawk because the same media that he used to publish the latest batch of wiki=leaks is now printing his linked Police record…oh dear…! WHat has Assange wrought the title asks…pretty much exactly what he has sown, I’d say…it seems that his urge for openness doesn’t apply to his own information…it amazes me how self-righteous Assange’s supporters become when their own privacy is challenged as it is now being at the rapid rate by various US government and law enforcement agencies…how dumb are some of these people when they blithely use US-based communications and networks, and then bleat when the US asserts ownership over information on those US-based networks, you know, things like Twitter, Facebook, Paypal, Google, etc, etc, etc…

Also on wikileaks, Chirol asks some long overdue questions about Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the Western world…

Even before Wikileaks, it was abundantly clear that Saudi Arabia is the largest financer of terrorism in the world. The US knows this, and Saudi knows we know. The continue to do to a half-assed job, doing enough to keep us happy but not enough to seriously attack the problem. My question, given that Saudi Arabia is not actually a major oil supplier to the United States (see Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Nigeria etc), what is keeping us from really putting the screws to them? Is it because maintaining an uneasy friendship and geting some cooperation is the lesser evil than making them an enemy? That is my reading of the situation. Would serious pressure even make them an enemy or could we still maintain decent relations? The more I think about it, the less I understand the special relationship we have today.

Not new news perhaps, when you get down to it, Osama Bin Laden was their dog and they’ve naff-all to shoot him or any of his rabid takfiri spawn…John Birmingham also makes a similar comment on spinelessness in the Gulf after wikileaks exposed “…Arab governments who’ve been caught out urging an attack on Iran…” He also comments on various leaked discussions regarding China’s true military capability and intentions with a link to a further Australian commentary on this topic…it’s worth a read but possibly only to see how confused Australian strategic thinking has been in the last decade: China has now taken over from the Indonesian bogey-man of the 70s and 80s, justifying Australia’s really quite amazing military expansion of its own…

Wiki…whatever….

Posted on 2 December 2010 by SJPONeill

Julian Assange’s latest exploits from Wikileaks have caused about as much real news as Y2K on 1 January 2000…after all the hype and expectation-massaging, the latest torrent of leaked documents is about as inspiring and memorable as George Lucas’ attempt at a prequel trilogy to the Original Trilogy…I once heard somewhere that the body doesn’t remember pain: it’s not that great at remembering boredom either and hopefully once the ripples in the pond subside, Assange will be marginalised by the growing realisation that he has actually done anything…all the risk was taken by those who actually leaked the quarter of a million documents in question and anyone who believes that one disgruntled PFC who’s just been dumped by his boyfriend can steal such a range of classified documents is living in Lala-land (much, in fact, like those in my previous post…)…

Michael Yon puts it all in perspective on his Facebook Page by linking Assange to other nutjobs….

It is HIGHLY doubtful that the United States government would kill Assange. If Assange is killed, the hit more likely would come from a lone wolf or someone else’s government. The conspiracy theorists might then “prove” that it was a CIA hit ordered by the same people who killed Kennedy, and that we didn’t really land on the moon but we do have a secret moon base. And 9/11 was a Jewish plot…

Never really thought about that before either…that the same people who deny the moon landings are the same ones who think the US/UN World Government has a secret Moonbase…but then again, when I was 10 I was a big fan of Gerry Anderson’s UFO and thought that building a secret Moonbase (complete with chicks with purple hair – the penny relating to the benefits of the short skirts hadn’t really dropped when I was that old) was a. pretty cool and b. pretty simple…

Dean covers it all pretty well in Wikileaks and ‘cablegate’ and I share his desperate plea to stop adding ‘gate’ to everything that has the slightest potential whiff of scandal attached to it…much the same as could we please stop referring to every campaign or initiative as a ‘war’ unless we really mean to fix bayonets, send in the Marines and let Air Combat Command off the leash…

And on ‘wars’, let’s not forget that, rhetoric aside, we’re not really at war at the moment…in at least one…yes, certainly…but ‘at’ war…no, not really: we’re not harnessing all the instruments of national power to quell the adversary and most definitely, we are not acting against those who seek to undermine the ‘war’ effort through accident or deliberate action. And that, boys, girls and family pets, is why people like Assange get away with what they do: because they are not breaking any laws…that their motives and actions are reprehensible is beyond question but even if it can be proved in the World Court (where else would have jurisdiction?) that the wikileaks were directly responsible for deaths in Afghanistan or elsewhere, it is not an offense to publish leaked material – not unless perhaps there is some form of court-ordered suppression order in effect. Even then, with the internet being what it is, it is unlikely that this would be that enforceable or provable…

But that notwithstanding, the lunatic fringe is out there demanding that Assange be arrested, assassinated or otherwise jabbed in the calf by a ricin-loaded umbrella. There’s a good thread at Small Wars Journal that hammers out the why-nots of this issue. In fact, Small Wars seems to be all over this one…WikiLeaks, Round Three provides a comprehensive list of links to various comments and reports on Assange’s latest non-event: note the DoD caveat at the top of the list, two or more wrongs DO NOT make a right:

Department of Defense personnel should not access the WikiLeaks website to view or download publicized classified information nor should they download it from anywhere, regardless of the source. Doing so will introduce potentially classified information on unclassified networks. Executive Order 13526 states ‘Classified Information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information.

Digital security problem is bigger than Assange and PFC Manning discusses the likelihood of kneejerk reactions to PFC Manning’s indiscretions (so just how does one PFC access let alone copy 250,000 classified military and diplomatic documents between making coffee, sweeping the floor and being unappreciated?) leading to balkanisation of military and government information systems ( and Dean raises this as well)…might as well since most of them can’t talk to each other anyway, but doing so effectively cedes the public information domain to the other guys – which is probably not the sharpest move we’d want to be making…

And finally a word from our sponsor for the current ‘war’, Secretary Gates, once again courtesy of Michael Yon :

I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think — I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets. Many governments — some governments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation.

So other nations will continue to deal with us. They will continue to work with us. We will continue to share sensitive information with one another.

Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.

The sooner we forget about Assange and let him be consumed by his own insignificance, the better…the real problem raised by the unauthorised release of close to half a million classified documents is what are we going to do a. about those who are releasing them in the first place (there can’t be THAT many briefcases and thumb drives left on the train each night)? and b. how do we train and educate their replacements that doing these is the wrong thing to do…?

Like, hello?

Posted on 27 November 2010 by SJPONeill

Is this where some people live?

I noticed an item on the Small Wars Journal blog this morning on my pre-breakfast scan of what’s up on the planet…in it Dr. Christopher Paul comments on an article (also in Foreign Policy) that is strongly critical of the RAND study Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, of which he was the lead author.

Dr Paul would be correct in his comments on the Hoyt/Rovner article except for the minor point that THEY are actually correct in what they say…

I hadn’t read the RAND ‘study’ in question until seeing this item in the SWJ Blog this morning but it is one that would have eventually crossed my desk for review…it’s 187 pages but having just read the summary and introduction, I don’t think it’s going to be a critical read for me anytime soon…

Although it quotes William Rosenau “…insurgency and counterinsurgency. . . have enjoyed a level of military, academic, and journalistic notice unseen since the mid-1960s…”, the authors have not included one single case study from this period that was the heyday of COIN (both as we know it and how others like the USSR and Cuba applied it)…like, hello? By selecting on those campaigns that started after 1978 – you didn’t consider Northern Ireland? Like, hello? – the RAND study only really focuses on a very narrow range of campaigns and even then I’m not convinced that there is much rigour in the selection of campaigns…we all know the COIN campaign in Kosovo, right? and Croatia and Bosnia? Some bad things may have happened in those countries but COIN? Hardly…the COIN campaign in Somalia was concluded in 1991? Papua New Guinea was a COIN loss? By PNG one assumes that the study is referring to Bougainville which is actually a success in that Bougainville is still a part of the nation it sought to break away from and the campaign that was conducted on that island actually addressed the root issues underlying the ‘insurgency’ – actually IAW one of the key COIN trusims…I also note that the use of repression as a strategy is frowned upon when, whether we in the West like it or not, historically (before and after 1978) it is one of the more consistently effective means of keeping a population in line…

I suspect that if I opt to wade through the remaining 161 pages of this ‘study’ (I have to use the term ‘study’ loosely), I will find find more such weak ‘logic’, poor research and inconsistency – and having written this, I find myself resigned to having to read the rest of it…

I wonder to what extent this paper was driven by statements at the COIN Symposium in May where various staff called for a COIN checklist, displaying a fundamental lack of ‘getting it’? While there are some fundamental principles/tenets/truisms for Countering Irregular Activity (COIN is too narrow a term for modern use) that a study like this may have analysed, one of them is that every campaign must be considered on its own merits i.e. there is no checklist in CIA!!

Perhaps, instead of using his position at Foreign Policy to have a self-righteous whiny-nana, Dr Paul might want to reflect on the comments here and in the Rovner/Paul article, and then go back to RAND and redo the job properly this time…

Critical thinking more and more seems to be superseded by a level of superficiality that is quite scary and I wonder if this is due to the economic crisis really putting the acid on academics to publish or really perish…? The really annoying this about products like this RAND ‘study’ is that so much information is freely available for them to do the job properly – the analysis is not that difficult – it’s the application in the contemporary environment that offers up the true challenges and weak superficial work like Victory Has a Thousand Fathers offers nothing to mitigate those challenges…

Later that day…Edit: just used this line in a discussion on this paper on Facebook…pretty well sums up my feelings…

“…I think it’s even worse than that…I simply don’t think they ‘get’ the environment we are operating in now so what they’ve done is pretty much like setting off to study the Third Reich and then limiting themselves to 1946 onwards…”

Staying focused in Afghanistan

Posted on 12 November 2010 by SJPONeill

A couple of months ago, in The Information (R)evolution, I made comment on an article in the Sept 10 C4ISR Journal, Shifting Terrain (After the C4ISR JOurnal site was taken down the only record of the original article I have is my original scribbled on one). On later reflection, I thought that it might be more constructive to offer a counterpoint to this article in the Journal as a means of furthering discussion and awareness of the nature of the contemporary operating environment. C4ISR Journal was happy to pick up my commentary and have just published it in the November 2010 issue…so, with no further ado, may I present for your professional information and review…Staying focused in Afghanistan…

The version published is actually the penultimate version but technology conspired against us while I was on the road last month and neither myself nor Ben Iannotta, the C4ISR editor, were able to close off the last few loose threads before the closure of the publishing deadline. I have a copy of the final version and will upload it here in a couple of weeks so as not to steal any fire from the Journal’s current issue…

I haven’t had a chance to read through the other articles yet except for NATO integrates ISR at all levels which I think is still a largely aspirational goal but at least someone senior is forcing the debate. While the lowest common denominator approach may have been successfully employed in peacekeeping operations in the 90s, where possibly the driving force within the operation is the number of national flags waving at the table, it remains patently unsound for operations to the right of peacekeeping on the spectrum of conflict. More complex campaigns require entry bars to be set across a range of key enablers that might include language, doctrine, technical interoperability in communications, C2 and information systems, and levels of training in selected key skills…

Today’s COIN Center VBB

Posted on 15 October 2010 by SJPONeill

As below, Dean presented at the COIN Center’s Virtual Brown Bag session this morning…the slides and audio file will be posted on the Center’s website in the next few days…I may be offline for a week or so as I am off globetrotting again but will link them in when I get an opportunity…in the meantime I strongly recommend that anyone with a personal or professional interest in contemporary intel issues, key an eye of the site and download both files when they become available. This is very good stuff and at least on a par with MG Flynn’s Fixing Intel paper from earlier this year…

Top effort from Dean and it is great to see a compadre’s efforts paying off like this….

As a taster, here’s some of the questions that were asked during the session (to hear the answers, you’ll need to download the files…)

MAJ Decker BCTP – guest: Coming in loud and clear

Peter Sakaris – guest: To understand the environment over time shouldn’t we be getting better more reliable HUMINT through increased population interaction? I would think that the example of a new officer working with a veteran police officer in the CONUS as you described would help to do this in the COIN environment. Obtaining the institutional knowledge of an environment can come from people that live in that environment because they live it every day and are in areas of the local community where it would be difficult for us to get into.

Kevin Frank JIWC – guest: Not will ing give up on the analysis issue- believe that if we collect the correct data and present it to the analyst correctly, we’ll get better analysis at the current training levels, especially if the commander is asking the right questions…comments?

DK Clark, DTAC/CGSC – guest: Did you use the pattern-analysis plot, activities matrix, association matrix, and societal considerations in FM 3-24.2? If so, could you comment on problems with these methods/techniques of framing and displaying the intel analysis in COIN?

MAJ Decker BCTP – guest: Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP) is now doing the same as the Boston Gun Project by providing retraining opportunities to former insurgents

HOMBSCH, DAVID G Lt Col : Comment only (no need to repeat): I love the quote – “analysts to be historians, librarians, journalists” – spot on. I also totally agree, with exploiting reach back – generate staff with expert knowledge on specific regions, who understand normality, and can interpret important changes (indicators and warnings) to cross cue counter insurgent forces. Hypothesis – there is a place for more foreign nationals in analysis teams in CONUS and allied intelligence agencies?

CPT Linn – guest: how are we integrating analysis into Data collected from FETs and HUMINTs in theater?

Peter Sakaris – guest: The Stability Academy, Kabul (formerly the COIN center of Excellence) is a COIN Academy that the leadership of deploying BCTs cycle through as part of their RIP/TOAs. They recommend the ASCOPE/PMESII-PT crosswalk as an analytical tool for helping gain the needed detailed understanding of the “complex human terrain”. Are you familiar with this, or other tools like it such as TCAPF and do you find them useful for this purpose? Have you seen other approaches not discussed that are/have been in use?

CPT Linn – guest: also how is that data utilized in targeting packages?

MAJ Allen Smith – guest: Do you vet and confirm info from gang leaders using SIGINT? How do you build trust on a Narc?

Kevin Frank JIWC – guest: There are many units out there reporting data (CATs, FETs, PRTs, unit reports etc) . But are they getting the right information? ASCOPE is one guide- are there other collection guides out there that can help us get better data? Does the LE community have anythi

Kevin Frank JIWC – guest: anything that can help?

RODRIGUEZ, ISMAEL R USA 2: Any thoughts on the application of GIS in a police intelligence role? Do you think these techniques could translate well in COIN?

And now…for your edification and education….

Posted on 14 October 2010 by SJPONeill

Just a quick advert that Dean from Travels with Shiloh will be presenting online at the COIN Center at 141500Z

Managing Land Conflict in Timor-Leste

Posted on 8 October 2010 by SJPONeill

This item just popped into the inbox…a great example of the sort of irregular activities that potentially threatens national or regional stability…using an interpretation of irregular that equates to ‘potentially destabilising’….

Dili/Brussels, 9 September 2010: Measures to resolve land disputes in Timor-Leste must go beyond a draft law on land titling if they are to comprehensively reduce the risks posed, otherwise the law could bring more problems than solutions.

Managing Land Conflict in Timor-Leste,* the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the country’s current tangle of land ownership claims, and recommends that the government and its partners act now to supplement titling with clear public information, clarify protections for those who will be evicted or resettled, and strengthen support to local mediation.

The need to balance land rights inherited from previous Portuguese and Indonesian colonial administrations with the reality of customary law, as well as the implications of a history of population displacements, have delayed the creation of a land administration system. Confusion over the present and future basis of property claims is widespread.

“Establishing legally enforceable property rights will inevitably create winners and losers,” says Cillian Nolan, Crisis Group South East Asia Analyst. “Unless the implications of this law are clearly understood, and protections developed for those who will be negatively affected, it risks being ignored or, even worse, becoming unenforceable”.

The current draft land law, approved by the Council of Ministers in March 2010 and awaiting parliamentary debate and approval, would establish the country’s first property ownership rights. Both the technicalities and the implications of the complex law are poorly understood. Sensitive issues include the fate of those Timorese who occupied empty properties in the violence following the 1999 referendum, the rights of Timorese living abroad to reclaim old property, and the holdings of the political elite. While passage of the draft law will help resolve many land disputes, further public information and debate should be a prerequisite for approval. Previous attempts to enforce laws on state property have often failed due to local resistance.

Though most disputes have to date been either resolved or frozen without recourse to violence, and many people are happy with the status quo, the issue will take on new urgency in light of ambitious new plans for government-driven development. Clarification of basic protections and resettlement plans for illegal or displaced occupants should be a priority, as should continued support to informal dispute mediation processes. The government should take initial steps now towards developing a comprehensive land use and housing policy, as well as to engage communities on sustainable ways of managing customary tenure systems.

“Timor-Leste cannot afford to wait much longer to establish a working mechanism for resolving property disputes as this is a key building block of the rule of law”, says Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. “Failing to do so could instead plant new seeds for future disputes.”